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 Abstract 
The disclosure of information by management to employees varies significantly between workplaces.  The 
effects of this variance on organizational performance are analysed using WERS98 data.  The results show that 
the impact of information disclosure on organisational performance is more complex than is often assumed in 
the literature.  Overall, there is a significant impact, both direct and indirect, and this varies depending on the 
level of employee organisational commitment, the type of information disclosed, and the performance outcome 
involved.  On the whole, the positive effects are less in union settings and in situations where unions are strong.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Disclosure of information by firms to their employees and representatives is encouraged as 
good practice by academics focusing on voluntary behaviour and increasingly by policy 
makers focusing on legal requirement.  For many of the former, information sharing or 
disclosure is seen as an element in management transparency yielding benefits in employee 
satisfaction, commitment, and motivation and thereby in organizational performance (Lawler, 
1995; Pfeffer, 1998).  For policy makers, particularly in the European Union (EU), disclosure 
of information, mandated through consultative or bargaining institutions, is part of the fabric 
of legislation underpinning human resource and industrial relations practice (EU Directive 
2002; DTI 2002 and 2003). 
Despite the growing interest on the part of both academics and policy makers in 
information sharing/disclosure, we still know relatively little about the effects of disclosure 
on organisational level outcomes.  Empirical work focusing specifically on organisational, as 
opposed to individual, level outcomes is limited and existing findings in the area are variable.  
Research by Lawler et al (1992) on a sample of Fortune 1,000 companies in the US suggests, 
for instance, that information sharing is positively related to various overall measures of firm 
quality and financial performance.  Other US research, however, shows disclosure benefits 
primarily for employees in the form of wage gains (Kleiner and Bouillon, 1988).  Japanese 
research, on the other hand, shows benefits accruing to the firm in terms of process 
advantages in negotiation duration, as well as outcome benefits in productivity and 
profitability (Morishima, 1989; 1991).  Some of these differences might easily be assigned to 
national cultural differences working through institutions, but equally, as suggested by 
Morishima (1991) it may be that different consequences reflect different forms of underlying 
‘game’ - broadly either co-operative or conflictual - between employers and employees and 
the effect this has on the propensity to disclosure. 
More generally, Kleiner and Bouillon’s (1988) and Morishima’s (1991) arguments 
direct attention to the possibility that the impact of information sharing on key organisational 
outcomes may vary depending on the specific context involved, so that, even within the same 
country, similar disclosure practices may generate different outcomes in different firms or 
workplaces.  This contingency type argument in the Labour Economics literature is in direct 
contrast to the generic universalistic argument advanced in some of the Human Resource 
Management (HRM) literature which suggests that voluntary provision of information by 
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management to employees can be expected to have a consistently positive impact on 
organisational performance (Pfeffer 1994; 1998). 
In this article, we use a large UK data set, namely the 1998 Workplace Employee 
Relations Survey (WERS98), to explore competing universalistic and contingency 
explanations of the impact of information disclosure on organisational performance which we 
operationalise in terms of labour productivity and product/service quality.  Specifically, we 
develop alternative universalistic and contingency hypotheses in the area and then test them 
on the WERS98 data.  
The structure of the article is as follows.  Section 2 summarises the key arguments of 
universalistic and contingency perspectives on information disclosure and presents the main 
hypotheses to be tested in the study.  Section 3 outlines the data set and the methods used in 
the analysis.  Section 4 presents the key findings.  Section 5 concludes by discussing 
theoretical and policy implications. 
 
 
2.  Theoretical Perspectives and Research Hypotheses 
 
Universalistic approach  
 
Central to the universalistic approach is the idea that it is good management practice – 
associated with benefits accruing to the firm – to keep employees informed on a range of 
issues relating to their jobs and broader organizational matters.  Within the HRM literature, 
claims about the benefits of information sharing are often embedded in broader arguments 
about the impact of so-called ‘high commitment’, ‘high involvement’, or ‘high performance’ 
human resource (HR) practices on organizational performance.  As noted by a number of 
writers, there is little agreement about which specific practices go to make up such work 
systems (Dyer and Reeves, 1995; Becker and Gerhart, 1996; Wood, 1999).  However, the 
systematic sharing of information with employees is commonly regarded as a core practice 
that is central to such systems and that, either singly or in combination with other practices, is 
assumed to contribute to the achievement of positive organisational outcomes (Ichniowski et 
al, 1996; Ostroff and Bowen, 2000; Appelbaum et al, 2000; Guest et al, 2000). 
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A detailed review of the HRM literature dealing with the link between information 
sharing and performance is beyond the scope of the present study.  Here it is sufficient to note 
two main points about this body of work and the universalistic perspective.  
The first point concerns the way information sharing is conceptualised and 
operationalised.  Studies in this area do not, by and large, make a clear distinction between 
the process and the content of information disclosure, between the various communication 
mechanisms that are used in organisations and the actual content of the information that is 
disclosed to employees.  In practice, information sharing is often operationalised in process 
rather than in content terms, focusing on the extent to which organisations use a range of 
possible practices and mechanisms to communicate with employees, such as the management 
chain, team briefings, consultative committees, and so on (Fernie and Metcalf, 1995; Addison 
and Belfield, 2001; Forth and Millward, 2002).  In some cases, information sharing is 
operationalised in both process and content terms (Appelbaum et al, 2000; Ramsey et al, 
2000).  However, few studies focus explicitly on the substantive content of disclosure 
practice, and those which do often treat disclosure as part of a broader bundle of HR 
practices, rather than looking at the impact which disclosure itself has on outcomes (Huselid, 
1995; Guest et al, 2000). 
Our interest here is in the substantive aspects of information disclosure.  Specifically, 
our interest is in the extent to which management disclosure of different types of information 
to employees, either directly or through representatives, affects key aspects of organizational 
performance, including labour productivity and product/service quality.  To this end, we 
focus on the disclosure of three main types of information to employees at the level of the 
establishment.  These include the extent to which management provides information to 
employees on (1) various aspects of the overall financial and staffing position of the 
establishment, (2) more specific production, quality, and operational targets set at the 
establishment, and (3) gives feedback on the achievement of these targets.  We refer to these 
three areas of disclosure as general information provision, disclosure of performance targets, 
and disclosure of performance results or performance feedback respectively.   
The second point concerns the theoretical explanations of the link between 
information disclosure and performance outcomes, which are advanced in the HRM literature 
and underpin the universalistic argument.  Central to this argument is the idea that 
information disclosure contributes to organisational performance by helping to align 
individual and organisational goals and by helping to enhance general levels of employee 
identification and integration at work (Guest, 1987; Pfeffer and Veiga, 1999; McElroy, 2001).  
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In other words, disclosure is hypothesised to contribute to the development of organizational 
commitment (OC), defined as the extent to which employees identify with their organisation 
and share its goals (Mowday et al, 1982; Meyer and Allen, 1991).  In turn, OC is 
hypothesized to have a positive impact on organisational performance by increasing 
employees’ willingness to exert effort on the job and to engage in various forms of 
discretionary behaviour at work that are of direct benefit to the organisation (Mathieu and 
Zajac, 1990; Meyer and Allen, 1997).  Evidence of the link both between information 
disclosure and employee commitment and between commitment and organisational 
performance is mixed (Meyer and Allen, 1997; Patterson et al, 1997; Guest et al, 2000; 
Ramsey et al, 2000).  Based on the available evidence and on the core commitment 
arguments outlined above, however, we expect information disclosure to have a positive 
impact on employee organisational commitment and employee commitment to have a 
positive impact on organisational performance.  Hence we propose the following main OC 
mediated, or indirect, universalistic hypothesis. 
H1:  Information disclosure will have an indirect positive effect on organisational 
performance through its impact on employee organisational commitment. 
Enhanced commitment is not the only mechanism through which information 
disclosure may have an impact on organisational performance.  There are other factors that 
may help to account for the positive performance effects of disclosure.  Goal setting theory, 
for example, suggests that providing employees with systematic information about 
performance targets and providing feedback on the achievement of goals can help to enhance 
performance by heightening motivation and focusing employee effort at work (Locke and 
Latham, 1990).  Similarly, certain strands of job design theory suggest that providing 
employees with fuller information about their work environment, including the position and 
operation of the organisation, may help to enhance the experienced meaningfulness of work, 
thereby contributing to employee motivation and, ultimately, to performance (Hackman and 
Oldham, 1980). 
To the extent that these or other mechanisms are operative and effective, information 
disclosure can be expected to have a separate additional impact on organisational 
performance which is not necessarily mediated by employee commitment.  On this basis, 
therefore, we propose a second non-OC mediated, or direct, universalistic hypothesis. 
H2:  Information disclosure will have a direct positive effect on organisational performance, 
above and beyond any indirect effect through employee organisational commitment. 
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Contingency approach 
 
Central to contingency arguments is the idea that the impact of information disclosure on 
organisational performance will not be constant.  Rather, it is likely to vary depending on a 
series of other factors or contingencies that affect and moderate the relationship between 
disclosure and outcomes.  Configurational perspectives on HRM (Becker and Gerhart, 1996; 
Delery and Doty, 1996) which focus on the synergistic effects of bundles of HR practices on 
organisational performance suggest, for example, that the maximum benefits of information 
disclosure are likely to accrue when other high performance practices are in place in the 
organisation.  Similarly, various flexible specialisation and general contingency theories of 
task and organisational design (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Galbraith, 1977; Mintzberg, 1983) 
suggest that the impact of disclosure may vary depending on the complexity of the production 
process and the skill composition of the workforce, with the achievement of both production 
efficiency and employee cooperation requiring higher levels of disclosure in more complex 
systems employing a higher proportion of skilled labour.  In other words, there are a number 
of factors that may moderate the impact of disclosure on outcomes.  Here, building on the 
work of Kleiner and Bouillon (1988) and Morishima (1989; 1991), we focus on employee 
organisational commitment as a key moderator affecting the relationship between disclosure 
and performance. 
As noted, Kleiner and Bouillon (1988) found that, in the US, voluntary information 
provision by firms was positively related to the level of employee benefits and wages, but 
unrelated to productivity, in both union and non-union settings.  Japanese evidence 
marshalled by Morishima (1989; 1991), on the other hand, yielded very different findings.  In 
his sample, information sharing was negatively associated with labour costs and positively 
related to profitability and productivity.  In addition, firms sharing more information 
experienced shorter and easier negotiation processes and unions demanded and accepted 
lower wage increases.  
These contrasting results may be attributed to differences in study methods or 
sampling, or to institutional arrangements, or to cultural differences between the US and 
Japan.  However, following Kleiner and Bouillon (1988), Morishima (1991) formulates a 
theoretical explanation in the nature of the underlying negotiating game between employers 
and employees.  A first game is goal alignment, in which disclosure operates to bring the 
parties closer together on the basis of shared understanding and information in what one 
might broadly characterize as integrative bargaining.  A second game, in which the idea of 
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information asymmetry is central, is a residual claims one, in which essentially distributive 
bargaining takes place over rents.  In the former case, which is seen to be characteristic of the 
Japanese system, one might expect higher levels of disclosure to have a positive impact on 
the negotiating process and, perhaps, on production and financial performance outcomes.  In 
the latter case, deemed characteristic of the US, there are strong incentives for management to 
limit voluntary disclosure, because employees in possession of greater information simply 
use it to extract a greater share of residual rents; the outcomes are therefore higher wages but 
lower profitability and, possibly, also productivity.  In the former game, therefore, disclosure 
helps to reconcile, in the latter it fuels employer-employee conflict.  It is a case of ‘gifts 
versus hostages’ (Williamson, 1983).  It follows from this that one needs to know the game 
before one can assess the implications of marginal disclosure for performance outcomes. 
Here we build on these ideas and extend them to organisational commitment which, 
as we have seen, refers to employees’ sense of goal integration and identification with their 
organisation and is, therefore, closely related to notions of goal alignment.  Specifically, 
drawing on the goal alignment arguments of Kleiner and Bouillon (1988) and Morishima 
(1991), we treat the extent of workforce commitment to the organisation as a key factor 
which may affect the impact of information disclosure on performance outcomes.  There are, 
however, different ways in which OC may moderate the impact of disclosure on outcomes.  
Here we focus on two possibilities. 
The first possibility is that information disclosure has a positive impact on 
organisational performance only, or primarily, when levels of OC amongst the workforce are 
high.  This is because committed employees are more likely to use any additional information 
they obtain from management for the benefit of the organisation.  Employees who are less 
committed are more likely either to ignore the information or to use it for their own benefit.  
When levels of commitment amongst the workforce are low, therefore, disclosure is likely to 
have either a negative or no effect on organisational performance.  This is essentially the goal 
alignment argument of Kleiner and Bouillon (1988) and Morishima (1991) and suggests that 
OC has a positive moderating effect on the link between disclosure and outcomes.  This 
posit ive moderator argument is captured in the following OC-based contingency hypothesis. 
H3: Information disclosure will have a stronger positive impact on organisational 
performance when the level of employee organisational commitment is high than when it is 
low.  
The second possibility is that the benefits of disclosure are greater in situations where 
the workforce is less rather than more committed to the organisation.  In this view, committed 
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employees, unlike ones who exhibit low levels of OC, can already be expected to exert a high 
level of effort on behalf of their organisation, irrespective of the amount of information they 
are provided with by management.  Hence, disclosure is likely to have less effect on their 
behaviour and performance than on that of less committed employees who may interpret the 
increased provision of information as a sign of management goodwill and cooperation and 
reciprocate accordingly.  Following this interpretation, therefore, the marginal benefits of 
disclosure can be expected to be greater in relation to non-committed than to committed 
employees, suggesting that OC has a negative rather than a positive moderating effect on the 
link between disclosure and outcomes.  We capture this negative moderator argument in the 
second of our OC-based contingency hypotheses. 
H4: Information disclosure will have a stronger positive impact on organisational 
performance when the level of employee organisational commitment is low than when it is 
high.  
Drawing on Kleiner and Bouillon (1988) and Morishima (1989; 1991), a final 
distinction may be made between unionised and non-unionised workplaces.  To the extent 
that residual claims games and overt conflicts of interest are more likely in unionised than in 
non-unionised establishments, disclosure can be expected to have a generally more limited 
impact on performance outcomes in the former than in the latter settings.  By the same token, 
in unionised settings, the impact is likely to be weaker where unions are stronger.  Because of 
the exploratory nature of these union-related arguments, we do not present them here as 
formal hypotheses in the same way as we do with the other universalistic and contingency 
arguments.  On balance, however, we expect support for both the main universalistic and 
contingency hypotheses identified above to be weaker in unionised than in non-unionised 
workplaces and, in unionised settings, to be weakest in establishments where unions are 
strongest.  
In summary, a selective review of the relevant HRM and Labour Economics literature 
suggests four main hypotheses about the impact of information disclosure on organisational 
performance, two universalistic and two contingent in nature.  Organisational commitment 
plays a central role in both sets of hypotheses.  Its role, however, is fundamentally different in 
the two forms of explanation.  In the main version of the universalistic argument, OC is 
assumed to mediate the impact of disclosure on performance, while in contingency models it 
is assumed to moderate the relationship between disclosure and outcomes.  These differences 
are captured in the four main hypotheses presented above, and, in general terms, these are 
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expected to find stronger support in non-unionised than in unionised settings, especially ones 
characterized by a strong union presence.  
 
 
3.  Methods 
 
The dataset used for the analysis is the WERS98 cross-section.  This contains information on 
2,191 British workplaces with 10 or more employees and consists of interviews with 
management, 918 workplace representatives, and a survey of 28,215 employees.  By 
weighting the data, the sample can be made representative of the population of British 
workplaces surveyed (Cully et al, 1999).  Data from both management and employees were 
used in the present analysis.  The survey contains data on a wide range of workplace features 
and in carrying out a multivariate analysis of the link between the supply of information and 
workplace performance, we controlled for variations between establishments in terms of size, 
sector, and a range of other characteristics.  The scope of the data sought in the 
questionnaires, the use of data from both management and employees, and the 
representativeness of the dataset, make WERS98 appropriate for this analysis.   
Probit, ordered probit, and ordinary least squares models were fitted to the data, 
depending on the nature of the dependent variable under consideration, and probability 
weights were used throughout.  For the latter part of the analysis, the sample was divided into 
union and non-union workplaces, depending on whether a union was recognized for the 
purpose of negotiating pay and conditions.  Union workplaces were further subdivided into 
those where the unions were weak and those where they were strong.  Union strength was 
measured by the number of issues over which union representatives negotiated with 
management at the establishment, out of a list of nine possible issues (pay or conditions of 
employment, recruitment or selection of employees, training, payment systems, grievances 
handling, staffing or manpower planning, equal opportunities, health and safety, and 
performance appraisals).  The sample mean on this variable was used to distinguish between 
strong and weak union contexts.  
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Dependent and intervening variables 
 
Two main dependent variables were used in the analysis.  These were the overall level of 
workplace labour productivity and product/service quality.  Both variables were derived from 
the WERS98 Management Questionnaire.  This asked managers to rate the labour 
productivity of their workplace, and the quality of the product/service produced at the 
establishment, relative to the average on a 5 point scale ranging from ‘A lot better than 
average’ to ‘A lot below average’.  As management responses are not evenly distributed 
between the five categories, it was decided to consider whether the response was above-
average, average, or below average.  It was then possible to fit a probit model to these two 
dependent variables. 
 The main intervening variable used in the analysis was the average level of employee 
organisational commitment at the workplace.  OC was measured with three items from the 
Employee Questionnaire.  These asked respondents to rate, on a five-point ‘strongly disagree’ 
(1) to ‘strongly agree’ (5) Likert scale, the extent to which they shared the values of the 
organisation, their feeling of loyalty to the organisation, and the extent to which they felt 
proud to tell people where they worked.  Responses to the three items were first combined 
into an overall OC scale (coefficient alpha = .83) and then aggregated across each workplace 
to give a measure of average employee commitment within each establishment.  An ordinary 
least squares model was then fitted to this intervening variable.  In separate analyses, this 
measure of organisational commitment was also used as a predictor of labour productivity 
and product/service quality.   
 
Independent disclosure of information variables 
 
The three main disclosure of information variables used in the analysis, namely, disclosure of 
general information, disclosure of performance targets and disclosure of performance results, 
were all based on data from the Management Questionnaire.  Specifically, managers in 
WERS98 were asked whether they regularly gave employees or their representatives 
information about internal investment plans, the financial position of the establishment, or 
staffing plans.  The disclosure of general information variable was based on the responses to 
theses three questions and indicates the total number of issues on which management shared 
information with employees.  The disclosure of performance targets variable measures the 
extent to which managers were prepared to supply operational-type information to employees 
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or their representatives and was derived using two questions on target setting and sharing 
from the Management Questionnaire.  Specifically, managers were asked whether they set 
targets for sales/fees/budgets, costs, profits, labour costs, productivity, product/service 
quality, labour turnover, absenteeism, and training.  They were further asked whether 
employees or employee representatives were informed of these targets.  The targets 
disclosure variable was constructed to reflect whether employers who set targets shared 
information on any of them with employees.  Two similar questions asked managers whether 
they kept records on the same set of nine issues listed above and whether they shared 
information on these records with employees.  The disclosure of performance results variable 
was constructed from these two  questions to indicate those establishments which kept records 
on at least one of these issues and shared the information which they collected with 
employees.   
To test the contingency hypotheses, three composite multiplicative variables were 
constructed designed to capture the interaction between organisational commitment and each 
of the three independent information sharing variables outlined above.  To reduce 
multicorrelinearity, all the multiplicative interaction term variables were mean-centered 
(Jaccard et al, 1990).   
 
Control variables   
 
Three sets of control variables were included in the analysis.  These were designed to capture 
key contextual, organisational and management factors that might have an impact on the 
performance outcomes, as well as on the information disclosure variables covered in the 
study.  All control variables were constructed from information obtained from the 
management component of the WERS98 survey.  The first set comprised a series of 
contextual variables including whether the workplace was in the private or public sector and 
the industrial sector in which the establishment operated.  The second group comprised a 
number of key structural and industrial relations characteristics of the establishment, 
including its size and age, the gender and skill composition of the workforce, the extent of 
industrial conflict in the past year and whether a union was recognised for purposes of 
negotiating pay and conditions.  The third group included a series of management variables 
covering key areas of human resource policy and practice.  These included, for example, 
whether the establishment had a strategic HR plan, whether it had a range of contingent pay, 
selection, communications, equal opportunities and family-friendly practices in place, and 
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whether there was an emphasis on multiskilling and on decentralised job design.  The specific 
control variables included in the analysis are listed in the note to Table 3. 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the three information disclosure 
variables, organisational commitment and the two outcome measures are presented in Table 
1.  Relevant statistics for the control variables are available from the authors upon request. 
 
 
4.  Results 
 
Descriptive results 
 
Table 2 shows descriptive data for the core organisational commitment and information 
disclosure variables covered in the study, for the sample as a whole and for union and non-
union establishments separately.  As can be seen, across the sample as a whole, the extent of 
disclosure varied considerably depending on the particular type of information involved.  
Thus, management provided information on performance targets in 82 per cent of 
establishments.  However, it disclosed general information on financial and staffing issues 
and provided feedback on the achievement of targets in only 40 and 19 per cent of 
establishment respectively.  At the same time, as can be seen, management was significantly 
more likely to disclose all types of information in union than in non-union establishments.  In 
contrast, average levels of employee organisational commitment tended to be significantly 
higher in non-union than in union workplaces.  
 
Tests of hypotheses 
 
The results of the regression analyses used to test the main universalistic and contingency 
hypotheses are shown in Table 3.  To save space, the results for the control variables are not 
included in the table but are available from the authors upon request.  
Equation 1 shows the impact of the three disclosure variables on organisational 
commitment, while equations 2 and 3 show the impact of both the disclosure variables and 
OC together on labour productivity and product / service quality respectively.  Taken 
together, these first three equations serve to test our two universalistic hypotheses (H1 and 
H2).  The last two equations are designed to assess the two contingency hypotheses (H3 and 
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H4) by testing for possible moderator effects in the data.  This was done by adding the 
interactions between the three disclosure variables and OC as predictors in the analysis.  The 
impact of the relevant interaction terms on labour productivity and product / service quality 
are shown in equations 4 and 5 respectively.  Below we examine each set of results in turn, 
starting with those relating to the two universalistic hypotheses. 
The first universalistic hypothesis (H1) states that the impact of information 
disclosure on organisational performance is positive, but indirect, mediated by OC.  The 
second universalistic hypothesis (H2), on the other hand, states that disclosure has a positive 
direct effect of its own on performance that is not mediated by commitment.  The results 
from equations 1, 2, and 3 are mixed, but provide at least partial support to both hypotheses.  
Specifically, contrary to the indirect universalistic hypothesis, equation 1 shows that neither 
the disclosure of general information by management nor the provision of performance 
feedback had a significant effect on employee commitment and that, in turn, commitment 
was not significantly related to product/ service quality (Equation 3).  In line with the 
hypothesis, however, equation 1 shows that the disclosure of performance targets had a 
positive impact on employee commitment (b  = .277, p < .001), and this, in turn, was 
positively related to labour productivity (equation 3: b  = .613, p < .01).  
Similarly, contrary to the direct universalistic hypothesis, equation 2 indicates that 
none of the information disclosure variables had a direct effect on labour productivity.  In 
addition, equation 3 shows that neither the disclosure of general information nor the sharing 
of performance targets by management had a direct impact on product/service quality.  In line 
with the hypothesis, however, management provision of performance feedback to employees 
was found to have a significant direct positive effect on product/service quality (Equation 3: 
b  = .688, p < .001). 
Turning to the two contingency hypotheses, the first of these (H3) states that the 
impact of information disclosure on organizational performance will be positively moderated 
by employee organisational commitment, while the second (H4) states that the moderating 
effect of OC will be negative .  The results relating to these two hypotheses are also mixed 
but, once again, provide partial support for both hypotheses.  As Table 3 shows, only two of 
the interaction terms in Equations 4 and 5 attained significance, and both were in relation to 
labour productivity.  Specifically, the interaction between performance feedback and OC in 
equation 4 is positive and significant (b  = .145, p < .05) suggesting that, in line with the first 
contingency hypothesis (H3), performance feedback had a stronger positive effect on labour 
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productivity in establishments where there were higher levels of employee commitment.  The 
specific form of the interaction is shown in Figure 1.  
In contrast, the interaction between management disclosure of general information 
and OC in Equation 4 is negative (b  = -.172, p < .05).  This suggests that, in line with the 
second contingency hypotheses (H4), general disclosure had a more positive effect on labour 
productivity in establishments where there were lower levels of employee commitment.  
However, as can be seen from the specific form of the interaction shown in Figure 2, the 
relationship between disclosure and productivity in this case was shifted in a negative 
direction.  On the whole, therefore, management provision of general information to 
employees was found to be negatively, rather than positively, related to productivity.  In line 
with the hypothesis, however, this negative effect was less pronounced in establishments 
characterised by lower levels of employee commitment.  
In brief, the results of the regression analyses for the sample as a whole provided 
selective support for all four main universalistic and contingency hypotheses.  The relevant 
results are summarised schematically in Figures 3a and 3b. 
 
Union vs. non-union settings 
 
As part of the analysis, we also tested the four universalistic and contingency hypotheses in 
non-union and union establishments separately.  The results are shown in Tables 4 and 5 
respectively and summarised in Figures 3c, 3d, 3e and 3f.  
Two main points stand out from this analysis.  First, the results for the sub-sample of 
non-union establishments are virtually the same as those outlined above for the sample as a 
whole (see Figures 3a and 3b vs. Figures 3c and 3d).  Second, in line with expectations, the 
results for union establishments are generally weaker than those for non-union 
establishments.  This is reflected in the fact that none of the contingency relationships found 
in the non-union sub-sample emerged as significant in the union sub-sample.  Moreover, 
while the non-contingent effects found for non-union establishments were reproduced also in 
the union sub-sample, in the latter case the effects involved were significantly attenuated.  
Specifically, as can be seen by comparing Figures 3d and 3f, in union settings, the positive 
link between performance feedback and product/service quality was weaker than in non-
union settings.  Similarly, in both union and non-union establishments, disclosure of 
performance targets by management had an indirect positive effect on labour productivity 
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through its impact on employee commitment.  However, as Figures 3c and 3e show, in union 
settings, this indirect effect was less pronounced since here the initial link between disclosure 
and OC was weaker.  In addition, in union settings the disclosure of performance targets had 
a direct negative impact on productivity, thereby cancelling out its positive indirect effect 
through commitment (see Figure 3e).  In other words, our results suggest that in union 
settings, unlike in non-union ones, the disclosure of performance targets by management did 
not have a significant overall effect on labour productivity. 
Of all the effects examined, only one was found to be stronger in union than in non-
union establishments.  This was the impact of general information disclosure on labour 
productivity.  In union workplaces, management disclosure of general information to the 
workforce had a direct positive impact on productivity, while in non-union establishments the 
effect was non-significant. 
 
Strong vs. weak unions  
 
For the union sub-sample, we also carried out separate analyses for establishments where the 
unions were weak and where they were strong.  The detailed results are reported in Tables 6 
and 7 respectively and are summarized in Figures 3g to 3j.  As can be seen, in this case, the 
results are not as clear-cut in the sense that, contrary to expectations, the impact of 
information disclosure on outcomes was not consistently weaker in workplaces where unions 
were stronger.  Specifically, where unions were weak there was, as in non-union settings, a 
direct positive link between performance feedback and product/service quality.  On the other 
hand, where unions were strong, the impact of performance feedback was not significant.  
(The same applies in terms of the impact of OC on labour productivity.)  At the same time, 
though, where unions were strong, general information disclosure by management was found 
to be positively related to labour productivity, while where they were weak, the relationship 
was, as in non-union settings, not significant.  
Overall, therefore, our results suggest that information disclosure had a stronger 
impact on outcomes in non-union than in union settings, but that the pattern of impact in 
union settings more closely resembled that found in non-union settings in establishments 
where the unions were weak than where they were strong.   
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5.  Discussion  
 
Drawing on specific strands of both the HRM and the Labour Economics literature, we 
developed and tested a series of alternative universalistic and contingency hypotheses about 
the impact of information disclosure on organisational outcomes. The specific outcomes 
considered were labour productivity and product/service quality.  The results of the analysis, 
based on the WERS98 data set, direct attention to a number of important points about the 
effects of information disclosure. These are highlighted below, together with the broader 
theoretical and policy implications of our findings.  
However, it is important at the outset to note some limitations of the study.  The 
problem of common method variance is reduced somewhat by using data from both 
management and employees.  However, such problems are not completely obviated since 
both the disclosure and the performance measures are based on data provided by 
management.  The cross-sectional nature of the WERS98 data makes it impossible to draw 
systematic causal inferences from the present analysis.  A more rigorous test of the main 
universalistic and contingency hypotheses would require the use of longitudinal data 
designed to capture changes in the relevant variables over time. 
 
Theoretical issues  
 
Taken as a whole, our findings provide selective support for both universalistic and 
contingency arguments in that all four hypotheses tested received at least partial confirmation 
in the analysis.  In other words, our results suggest that the impact of information disclosure 
on organisational performance is considerably more complex than is commonly assumed in 
the literature.  Overall, the impact is both direct and indirect and varies depending on the 
level of commitment of employees, the type of information disclosed, and the performance 
outcome involved.  It also differs between union and non-union settings.  The specific pattern 
of results involved was outlined above and does not need to be described again.  Here we 
focus on the main points to emerge from our analysis.  We begin by looking at the results and 
implications of the overall analysis carried out across the full sample of WERS98 
establishments.   
In terms of the different types of disclosure examined, our results indicate that 
management’s systematic sharing of information on performance targets relating to various 
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aspects of the operation of the organisation can help to enhance employee commitment and 
that this, in turn, has a positive impact on labour productivity.  This finding is in line with 
standard universalistic OC-based mediation arguments found in the HRM literature.  It 
suggests that, in general, the disclosure of operational performance targets to employees can 
have a beneficial effect on productivity, but that the impact involved is indirect, mediated by 
commitment.   
The provision of feedback on the achievement of operational targets also has an 
impact on labour productivity.  In this case, though, the impact is more complex in that it 
tends to vary depending on the level of commitment of employees.  Specifically, in line with 
contingency-based goal alignment arguments derived from Kleiner and Bouillon (1988) and 
Morishima (1991), our results indicate that, across the sample as a whole, performance 
feedback only tends to have a positive effect on labour productivity where levels of employee 
organisational commitment are high.  Where commitment is low, performance feedback has 
little or no effect on productivity.  In other words, our analysis suggests that the disclosure of 
operational results by management can have a beneficial effect on labour productivity, but 
that this is likely to be the case primarily in situations where there already is a reasonable 
degree of alignment between individual and organisationa l goals.  
The results relating to the disclosure of general information by management present a 
different picture.  Our analysis suggests that, across the sample as a whole, the disclosure of 
general financial and manpower information tends, by and large, to have little or no effect on 
labour productivity.  This is the case especially where levels of employee commitment are 
low.  However, where commitment is high, general information disclosure tends to be 
negatively, rather than positively, related to productivity.  One possible explanation for this 
unexpected result is that it simply reflects the fact that, other things being equal, management 
is likely to be more willing to disclose ‘bad news’ to employees who exhibit high, rather than 
low, levels of commitment to the organisation.  This would help to account for the stronger 
negative relation observed between disclosure and productivity at higher levels of 
commitment.  It would also suggest, however, that disclosure may be a function of 
organisational performance, rather than the other way around as originally hypothesised, 
thereby raising important questions about direction of causality.   
In this context it is also worth noting that information disclosure tends, on the whole, 
to have a much weaker impact on product/service quality than on labour productivity.  
Specifically, our results for the total sample show that of the three types of disclosure 
examined, only the disclosure of information on operational performance outcomes has a 
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significant impact on quality.  The impact in this case is positive and direct, thereby lending 
support to the idea that information disclosure, as suggested by alternative non-OC mediated 
universalistic arguments derived form the HRM literature, can have a beneficial effect on 
organisational performance independent of the impact it has on employee commitment.  
Although important in their own right, the above findings may also be considered in 
relation to the more detailed analysis of union and non-union settings.  The results of this 
more analysis contribute to a richer understanding of the effects of information disclosure by 
directing attention to the wider institutional conditions under which particular patterns of 
effects are likely to hold.  As such, they serve to identify key boundary conditions of the main 
universalistic and contingency arguments. 
As we saw above, information disclosure tends to be greater in union than in non-
union settings.  However, these higher levels of disclosure do not necessarily translate into 
higher levels of either employee commitment or organisational performance in union 
contexts.  Our results suggest, in fact, that the general pattern of direct, indirect, and 
moderated benefits associated with disclosure, applies primarily to non-union rather than to 
union establishments.  In the latter case, the overall pattern of effects is generally less 
pronounced.  Thus, many of the direct, indirect, and moderated effects of disclosure observed 
in non-union establishments are either much attenuated or do not hold at all in union settings, 
especially in establishments where unions are strong. 
The one major exception to this pattern of attenuated union effects is in relation to the 
disclosure of general financial and staffing information by management.  In union 
establishments, unlike in non-union establishments, this form of disclosure has a positive 
direct impact on labour productivity.  Apart from this, however, the results of our more 
detailed analysis support the idea, derived from residual claims arguments, that information 
disclosure in union settings is more likely to have a weaker positive impact on performance 
outcomes than in non-union settings, and that, within union settings, the impact is likely to be 
weakest where unions are strongest.  The disclosure of performance targets was, in fact, 
actually found to have a negative impact on productivity in union settings, suggesting that in 
these settings labour may indeed use operational information provided by management in a 
more opportunistic way.  For the most part, though, disclosure in union settings was found to 
have little or no effect on performance outcomes.  On balance, therefore, our results suggest 
that there are greater direct and indirect benefits to be reaped from information disclosure in 
non-union than in union settings, but that in union establishments the impact of disclosure is 
likely to be more neutral than negative.  
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Equally important, our results indicate that employee organisational commitment 
plays a far more important explanatory role in non-union than in union settings, either as a 
mediator or as a moderator of the impact of disclosure on performance outcomes.  Thus, in 
union settings, disclosure not only has a weaker positive impact on commitment, but OC, in 
turn, also has more limited direct and moderator effects on performance.  Taken together 
these findings suggest that information disclosure is likely to produce a greater degree of 
alignment between individual and organizational goals in situations where management has a 
clearer monopoly of information and where, because of the lack of a union presence and 
voice, alternative sources of information and competing interpretations of events are likely to 
be less easily available to employees.  In other words, in union settings, emp loyees are likely 
to have access to a greater variety and diversity of information.  As a result, management 
disclosure in these settings is less likely to lead to employee goal alignment and commitment 
and, hence, tends to have a generally weaker impact on performance outcomes. 
In summary, the results direct attention to the fact that neither the main OC-based 
mediation arguments nor the main OC-based moderator arguments tested in the study 
necessarily apply across all institutional contexts.  Rather, our findings suggest that both sets 
of arguments are more likely to hold in non-union than in union settings.   
 
Policy implications  
 
These findings have implications, for policy makers and legislators, for firms and their 
information practices, and for trade unions. 
Currently, in the UK, there are no general legal requirements for firms to disclose to 
employees information such as we have discussed here.  In specific areas, such as health and 
safety, there are broad requirements.  Particular episodes, such as redundancy, may trigger 
disclosure of economic information to employees or their representatives.  Collective 
bargaining may trigger disclosure to trade unions, but under rather restrictive conditions 
(Gospel et al, 2003).   
The European Directive on Information and Consultation will introduce such a 
general requirement and will be introduced in the UK against the backdrop of a highly 
diversified institutional environment (Wood and Fenton-O’Creevy, 2001; Gospel and 
Willman, 2003).  Our findings indicate that the performance impact of such a general 
requirement is highly likely to vary, depending on existing organisational and institutional 
conditions, specifically depending on existing levels of employee organisational commitment 
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and on the presence and strength of trade unions.  They also suggest that different forms of 
disclosure are likely to be more important in some contexts than others.  Overall, disclosure 
of operational information on performance targets and outcomes is likely to yield greatest 
benefits to the firm, especially in non-union settings.  But general information disclosure is 
also likely to be important and have a positive effect, particularly in union settings. 
An implication for management to be drawn from our findings may be that there is an 
optimal sequence to disclosure.  Disclosure of performance targets enhances organizational 
commitment and has a positive impact on productivity, but it also affects how employees 
respond to other types of information disclosure.  To maximize the impact of disclosure, 
firms might wish to consider initiating disclosure on performance targets, then expand the 
disclosure agenda to include information on performance outcomes.  It may be that there is an 
underlying learning model here for employees based on goal setting establishing an appetite 
for firm performance information.  However, in union settings, it may be best for 
management to focus directly on disclosure of general information.  Likewise, for unions, the 
most obvious role is in terms of general information, and here disclosure can have a positive 
impact on organizational performance.  However, the findings also suggest that there is scope 
for unions to play a positive role in the receipt of operational information which affects 
employee commitment and labour productivity.  
 
Directions for future research 
 
Future research should seek to overcome the limitations of this study by using longitudinal 
data obtained form both management and employees.  Ideally, researchers should use more 
detailed measures of disclosure that would allow for a more refined analysis of the effects of 
information-sharing on organisational performance.  They should also, where possible, seek 
to use objective, along with subjective, performance data.  
 Importantly, future research could also usefully extend the analysis to other 
performance outcomes and look, for example, at the impact of disclosure on various aspects 
of the financial and market performance of organisations.  Even more broadly, future 
research might also explore the impact of information disclosure on a range of human 
resource, industrial relations, and employee-related outcomes, including, for example, levels 
of conflict, turnover and absence, and satisfaction and well-being at work.  Finally, we also 
need to gain a better understanding of the impact of information disclosure in different 
institutional contexts.  In particular, more work is required to examine the effects that the 
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disclosure of different types of information to both employees and their representatives can 
have in union settings, and at the way in which different forms of disclosure may interact in 
these situations. 
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Table 1 
 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Main Independent and Dependent 
Variables Used in the Analysis of the Total Sample 
 
     Mean   SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Organizational Commitment 3.62 .03  
2. Disclosure of General Info.             1.95    .07   .09    
3. Disclosure of Perf. Targets                .82 .03 .17 .34 
4. Disclosure of Perf. Results                .19    .02 .09 .27 .17 
5. Labour Productivity                           .50    .03 .14 .08 .04 .04 
6. Product/Service Quality                     .78    .02 .11 -.02 .02 .03 .21 
 
Correlations  > .07, p < .05; Correlations > .08, p < .01; Correlations > .13, p < .001 
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Table 2: 
Descriptive Data 
 
Percent of establishments where    Non-Union Union 
management disclosed:  Total Sample Subsample  Subsample   
 
Full range of general information 40%  33%  60% *** 
Performance targets info.  82%  78%  92% *** 
Performance results info.  19%  14%  32% *** 
Mean level of employee OC  3.62  3.64  3.57 *** 
(N)     (937)  (444)  (493) 
 
*** Difference between non-union and union subsamples significant at p < .001 
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Table 3: 
 
Tests of Hypotheses for Total Sample: Regression Results 
 
 
             1     2      3     4      5 
     Labour  Prod./Serv. Labour  Prod./Serv. 
Independent Variables         OC Prod.  Quality  Prod.  Quality 
 
Disclosure of         -.007 .027  -.094  .046  -.087  
General Information      (.028) (.087)  (.089)  (.085)  (.087) 
  
Disclosure of          .277*** .033  .338  -.028  .347 
Performance Targets       (.079) (.237)  (.240)  (.246)  (.247) 
 
Disclosure of         -.027 -.053  .688*** -.095  .689*** 
Performance Results      (.066) (.181)  (.178)  (.183)  (.175) 
 
Org. Commitment        .613*** .113  .624*  .160 
     (.199)  (.203)  (.199)  (.194) 
 
General info x OC       -.172*  -.079 
         (.078)  (.084) 
 
Perf. Targets x OC       .007  .061 
         (.069)  (.064) 
 
Perf. Results x OC       .145*  -.064 
         (.063)  (.068) 
         
 
(N)      (937)  (937)   (937)   (937)   (937) 
 
 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05 
 
Note: The model controls for the following contextual, organisational and HRM variables: 
workplace was in the private sector; industry sector; number of employees at establishment; 
workplace less than 10 years old; gender composition of workforce; more than half the workforce in 
managerial, professional or technical occupational groups; union recognized for purposes of 
negotiating pay and conditions; collective dispute in past year; number of topics on which 
management keeps records; establishment had a strategic plan covering employee development and 
staffing forecasts, with someone responsible for employee relations at the workplace involved in 
formulation; recruitment based on personality or performance tests, or ability, or motivation; most 
employees in largest occupational group trained to do jobs other than own; those in largest 
occupational group had a lot of variety in their jobs; regular briefings for any sections of the 
workforce as well as quality circles and a joint consultative committee which discussed a range of 
topics; deferred profit-sharing scheme; profit-related payments or bonuses; employee share ownership 
scheme or individual or group performance related schemes; formal written policy on equality of 
treatment on grounds of gender; non-managerial employees allowed to switch from full- to part-time 
employment; financial help with childcare for non-managerial staff; employees paid when need to 
take time-off at short notice; non-managerial employees on flexitime.  
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Table 4: 
 
Tests of Hypotheses for Non-Union Subsample: Regression Results 
 
 
             1      2       3     4      5 
     Labour  Prod./Serv. Labour  Prod./Serv. 
Independent Variables         OC Prod.  Quality  Prod.  Quality 
 
Disclosure of         -.000 -.044  -.153  -.030  -.158  
General Information      (.026) (.103)  (.122)  (.100)  (.117) 
  
Disclosure of          .215** .216  .427  .080  .414 
Performance Targets       (.080) (.282)  (.288)  (.290)  (.292) 
 
Disclosure of         -.104 .048  1.59*** -.332  1.65*** 
Performance Results      (.099) (.268)  (.442)  (.303)  (.375) 
 
Org. Commitment        .699**  .367  .803*** .015 
     (.236)  (.263)  (.227)  (.273) 
 
General info x OC       -.226*  -.011 
         (.099)  (.121) 
 
Perf. Targets x OC       -.113  -.082 
         (.098)  (.087) 
 
Perf. Results x OC       .441*** -.227 
         (.093)  (.120) 
         
 
(N)        (444) (444)   (444)   (444)   (444) 
 
 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05 
 
 
 
Note:  Same controls as in Table 3 (except for union recognition variable). 
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Table 5: 
 
Tests of Hypotheses for Union Subsample: Regression Results 
 
 
             1      2       3     4      5 
     Labour  Prod./Serv. Labour  Prod./Serv. 
Independent Variables         OC Prod.  Quality  Prod.  Quality 
 
Disclosure of         -.029  .269*  -.052   .264*  -.086  
General Information      (.023) (.114)  (.108)  (.117)  (.121) 
  
Disclosure of          .199* -1.16**  .423  -1.33*** .701 
Performance Targets       (.079) (.344)  (.327)  (.484)  (.448) 
 
Disclosure of          .030 .024  .424*   .031   .463* 
Performance Results      (.043) (.196)  (.192)  (.195)  (.188) 
 
Org. Commitment        .923**  .496  1.04**  .520 
     (.283)  (.281)  (.311)  (.320) 
 
General info x OC       -.056   .015 
         (.122)  (.121) 
 
Perf. Targets x OC       -.036   .161 
         (.124)  (.119) 
 
Perf. Results x OC       -.069      -.122 
         (.087)  (.087) 
         
 
(N)        (493) (493)   (493)   (493)   (493) 
 
 
 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05 
 
 
 
Note:  Same controls as in Table 3 (except for union recognition variable). 
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Table 6: 
 
Tests of Hypotheses for Weak Union Subsample: Regression Results 
 
 
             1      2       3     4      5 
     Labour  Prod./Serv. Labour  Prod./Serv. 
Independent Variables         OC Prod.  Quality  Prod.  Quality 
 
Disclosure of         -.026  .236   .056   .254   .067  
General Information      (.030) (.139)  (.135)  (.141)  (.139) 
  
Disclosure of          .129 -1.06**  .336  -1.31**  .650 
Performance Targets       (.108) (.406)  (.404)  (.498)  (.507) 
 
Disclosure of          .007 -.026  .464*   -.022   .539* 
Performance Results      (.049) (.221)  (.229)  (.222)  (.226) 
 
Org. Commitment        1.05**  .429  1.08**  .531 
     (.325)  (.374)  (.347)  (.398) 
 
General info x OC        .037   .086 
         (.122)  (.138) 
 
Perf. Targets x OC       -.111   .191 
         (.129)  (.123) 
 
Perf. Results x OC       -.023      -.178 
         (.093)  (.102) 
         
 
(N)        (319) (319)   (319)   (319)   (319) 
 
 
 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05 
 
 
 
Note:  Same controls as in Table 3 (except for union recognition variable). 
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Table 7: 
 
Tests of Hypotheses for Strong Union Subsample: Regression Results 
 
 
             1      2       3     4      5 
     Labour  Prod./Serv. Labour  Prod./Ser 
Independent Variables         OC Prod.  Quality  Prod.  Quality 
 
Disclosure of          .034  .456*   .312   .479*   .383  
General Information      (.027) (.209)  (.221)  (.246)  (.282) 
  
Disclosure of          .159 -1.52*  -.144  -3.41**   .185 
Performance Targets       (.121) (.588)  (.536)  (1.09)  (.767) 
 
Disclosure of          .113  .139  .393    .015   .459 
Performance Results      (.069) (.403)  (.354)  (.406)  (.348) 
 
Org. Commitment         .763  .314  1.26*  .153 
     (.489)  (.482)  (.594)  (.722) 
 
General info x OC        .082   .001 
         (.222)  (.260) 
 
Perf. Targets x OC       -.569   .216 
         (.340)  (.322) 
 
Perf. Results x OC       -.167      -.044 
         (.164)  (.152) 
         
 
(N)        (170) (170)   (170)   (170)   (170) 
 
 
 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05 
 
 
 
Note:  Same controls as in Table 3 (except for union recognition variable). 
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Figure 1. Performance Feedback x OC Interaction For Labour Productivity
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Figure 2. General Information x OC Intercation for Labour Productivity
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Figure 3. Schematic Summary of Regression Results  
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Appendix 1:  Evidence Submitted on the DTI Discussion Paper ‘High 
Performance Workplaces:  Informing and Consulting Employees’ 
 
The above paper was submitted as evidence to the Department of Trade Industry consultation 
process ‘High Performance Workplaces – Informing and Consulting Employees’.  In 
addition, further evidence was submitted which dealt with separate questions posed in the 
consultation process.  This evidence is outlined here. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The evidence presented here is in three parts.  Part 1 gives summary responses to three 
specific questions on which comments are invited in the consultation paper.  Part 2, contains 
some broader comments on two more general questions posed about the proposed 
Regulations and the analysis which underpins them.  Part 3 is the longest section and presents 
recent research findings on information disclosure and organisational performance in the UK.  
 
 
A1.  Responses to Specific Questions  
 
In the first place, we respond to the three specific questions which are posed in the 
consultation paper (Chapter 3 and 4.47 – 4.53).   
 
A1. 1.  Should provision be made for information and consultation at the level of 
establishments, undertakings, and groups of undertakings? 
 
We see a lack of clarity in the consultation document concerning the analysis of how modern 
organisations, in particular in the private sector, are organised.  Basically, we believe that 
there should be the provision for representation at multiple levels. 
The document outlines the formal position.  This is that an establishment is a physical 
entity such as a plant, office, or retail outlet; an undertaking is a legal entity such as an 
individually incorporated company.  An undertaking may carry on business at one or more 
establishments.  A corporate structure could consist of several (or many) individual 
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undertakings (i.e. subsidiaries) formed into a group of undertakings connected by 
shareholding structures.  The government intends that the Regulations will apply to 
undertakings with 50 or more employees.  (As an aside here, it might be pointed out that the 
Regulations, allowing for part-timers to be counted as 0.5, may be discriminatory under EU 
law.) 
In practice, the modern business enterprise is organised in more complex ways than the 
consultation document implies.  Most large, and many medium sized, firms in the UK are 
multi-establishment and are usually multi-product.  For a long time, this has led to firms 
being organised on a multi-divisional basis.  In these cases, some key operational decisions 
are made at the divisional level.  These may include decisions about middle-range 
investments and divestments, product research and development, and personnel issues such 
as the fixing of pay and conditions, the organisation of work, and decisions about 
employment levels.  However, major decisions in most of these areas will still be made by 
top management at group or corporate level.  To complicate the matter further, in recent 
years, it is sometimes suggested that there is a growing decentralisation in firms, with more 
and more decisions being pushed down to lower levels of management and with the growth 
of looser network forms of organisation, including aspects of outsourcing and joint ventures 
with other firms.  In practice, there have always existed in the UK complex, holding-
company type arrangements and there may indeed at the present time be some move in the 
direction of greater decentralisation and network type organisation.  However, at the same 
time, these changes should not be exaggerated and key decisions are still made at overall 
group / corporate level. 
We argue that employee representation needs to be able to operate at all these levels.  
At the present time, this is not the case.  In terms of the distribution of consultative 
committees, in the private sector, in 1998, 26 per cent of all workplaces had such a 
committee.  However, 16 per cent of workplaces had a committee at workplace level, 18 per 
cent had one at a higher level, but only 8 per cent had one at both levels (Cully et al. 1999:  
99; Millward et al.2000:  109).  Our own research suggests that local managements may well 
not have crucial information and are therefore not able to share it with employees and 
properly consult until it is often too late.  Moreover, if in the words of the Directive, 
information is to be provided at the ‘relevant level of management depending on the subject 
under discussion’, then in many instances, this must mean at the level not only of the 
establishment but also of the division or subsidiary and the corporate group.   
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Moreover, we would draw attention to the continental European evidence.  In France, 
for example, the legislation on the comité d’enterprise allows that, in the case of large multi-
plant enterprises and holding companies, where information received by any individual 
committee would be incomplete and where the decision-making centre is beyond the reach of 
any one committee, a central committee may be established.  In Germany, there is also 
provision for works councils (Betriebsrat) to be established at a number of levels, including 
at the level of the division and the overall concern or holding company.  This law has recently 
been strengthened.  If British workers are not to be given a similar right, to establish 
information and consultation procedures at multiple levels, then they might be deemed to be 
disadvantaged in comparison to their continental counterparts and this might in turn become 
an issue for the European Court of Justice, given in particular the wording of the Directive 
quoted above. 
It should be possible to make arrangements at multiple levels (establishment, 
undertaking, and group of undertakings) and the Regulations should facilitate this as being in 
the spirit of the Directive.  The Regulations covering pre-existing, voluntary, and standard 
fall-back agreements should allow for this.  The existence of a pre-existing, negotiated, or 
standard procedure at a lower level should not preclude higher level arrangements and vice 
versa. 
 
A1.2.  What should be the relationship with existing legal information and consultation 
arrangements? 
 
The discussion paper refers to other legislation which imposes an obligation on employers to 
inform and consult employees.  It refers specifically to obligations in the case of collective 
redundancies, transfers of undertakings, and where there is a European Works Council.  In 
practice, there are other such obligations in UK law covering pensions, working time, health 
and safety.  There is also an obligation, under the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
Consolidation Act, to provide information to a trade union without which it would be 
materially impeded in the conduct of collective bargaining and which it would be in 
accordance with good industrial relations practice to disclose.  An Advisory Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service (ACAS) Code of Practice on Disclosure of Information has existed in this 
area since 1977 and stands unamended since then.  Information and consultation committees, 
as constituted under the Regulations, would be eligible to use the provisions which relate to 
collective redundancies, transfer of undertakings etc.  It is also arguable that, in the absence 
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of a trade union and if a committee was deemed to be the equivalent of a trade union, that it 
might also be eligible to use the latter provisions under the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations Act. 
At first sight, it might seem that there is a case for tidying up and unifying the legal 
requirements in the area of information and consultation.  These have developed in an ad hoc 
and piecemeal fashion.  Consolidation would then provide a more consistent and more easily 
understood basis for informing and consulting employees at work.  It would also alleviate 
some of the burdens on firms by rationalising existing requirements.  However, there are a 
number of problems.  First, the draft Regulations, following the Directive, refer to both 
specific instances and types of information and consultation (e.g. on anticipatory measures 
which may be a threat to employment) and to general instances and general types of 
information and consultation (e.g. on present and probable future developments of the 
undertaking).  Both types of information and consultation might be too general and of 
insufficient value for employee decision-making in areas such as pensions, health and safety, 
and working time where it is necessary and possible to specify more detailed information and 
consultation obligations.  Second, the law, as it has developed in the UK, has also come to 
provide a hierarchy of information and consultation mechanisms, in the area of collective 
redundancies and transfer of undertakings:  in the first place, information and consultation 
should take place with a recognised trade union where such exists; in the second place, it 
should take place with a standing committee, where such exists; and in the third place, it 
should take place with a body elected specifically for the purposes where neither of the 
previous exist.  This legal doctrine has developed in a complex manner, fo llowing 
judgements by the European Court of Justice.  To depart from these arrangements might be 
seen to be a retrograde step which may prejudice effective worker rights.  It should be noted 
that the Directive itself states that its implementation should not be grounds for any 
retrogression.   
On the whole, therefore, we argue that from both a practical and legal point of view, 
already existing legal arrangements should for the most part stand.  However, some 
uniformity could be introduced, such as in terms of penalties for non-compliance, though, to 
meet EU requirements, this would have to be based on a levelling-up and a not a levelling-
down.  This would also allow for penalties to be introduced which are, in the words of the 
Directive, ‘effective, proportionate, and dissuasive’ which arguably the £75,000 fine in the 
Regulations is not.  In addition, we have argued elsewhere, that there is a case for revisiting 
the arrangements under the Trade Union and Labour Relations Consolidation Act which 
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provide for the provision of information to trade unions and which are to be found in the 
relevant ACAS Code of Practice (Gospel et al, 2003).  (As stated above, for good or ill, it 
might be conceivable that a standing committee or council could be construed by the courts 
as the equivalent of a trade union.) 
 
A1.3.  What should be the relationship between the information and consultation 
procedures under the Regulations and collective bargaining with trade unions? 
 
The evidence from 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS98) suggests that 
information and consultation arrangements and trade unions tend to complement one another 
in a number of ways.  Thus, union recognition and consultative committees appear to be 
associated.  In 1998, 38 per cent of workplaces with a recognized union had a committee, 
compared to 20 per cent of those where there was no union presence.  On the basis of this, the 
authors of the WERS98 summary volume conclude that ‘union representation and indirect 
employee participation go hand in hand rather than being substitutes’ (Cully et al. 1999:  100-
1). 
As an aside, we would add that there would also seem to be a link between union 
recognition, joint consultative arrangements, and various forms of direct participation and 
employee involvement (workforce meetings, briefing groups, and problem-solving circles).  
It would seem, however, that the causal link runs from representative to direct participation.  
Much academic research suggests that the latter is more likely to survive and be effective 
where indirect representation via unions or joint consultation is strong.  This should be kept 
in mind, when, on one interpretation and we believe an erroneous interpretation, the 
Regulations seem to allow for direct forms of participation to suffice in terms of meeting the 
requirements of the Directive.  Re- iterating our earlier submission to the DTI, the strongest 
case against direct participation sufficing is that, on our reading of the Directive, if 
challenged, direct forms of participation would not qualify, because they would not pass tests 
of independence, employee approval, dialogue with representatives, and permanency. 
Our research on information disclosure shows that more information is provided to 
employees where there is a trade union (as cited below).  Further ongoing research also 
suggests that, where there is a works council / consultative committee, more information is 
provided to employees, but not as much as where there is a trade union.  Where a trade union 
and a works council / consultative committee co-exist, slightly more information is provided 
to employees than where there is just a trade union.  It should be noted that forms of direct 
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participation do not seem to add significantly to the amount of information which is provided 
to employees.  Moreover, it also relevant that there is a hierarchy in terms of the survival of 
mechanisms, with direct participation the most fragile, works councils / consultative 
committees lasting longer, and trade union recognition being the most durable.  Works 
councils / consultative committees are most likely to survive and function where there is trade 
union recognition (Cully et al. 1999:  chapter 2) 
There is also evidence that employees see trade unions and information and 
consultation committees as complementary.  The relevant evidence is to be found in the 
British Workplace Representation and Participation Survey (BWRPS) (Diamond and 
Freeman 2001; Gospel and Willman, 2003).  A majority (72 per cent) of employees polled 
think their workplaces would be better with some form of collective representation. This 
breaks down as 92 per cent of union members and 61 per cent of non-union employees.  In 
the case of union members, it is striking that 74 per cent favour both a union and a joint 
consultative committee / works council.  Non-union employees’ wishes are more dispersed:  
34 per cent want no form of representation; only 5 per cent favour a union on its own; 27 per 
cent favour a joint consultative committee on its own; and 29 per cent favour a joint 
consultative committee and a trade union.  Workers in situations where there is already a 
union and a consultative committee are the most in favour of dual-channel representation (72 
per cent), but it is also striking that workers in situations where there is a recognized union or 
a union presence are also well disposed to dual representation. There is little preference for a 
consultative committee / works council on its own, except where this already exists.  All this 
suggests that many union and non-union members see trade unions and representative 
information and consultation institutions as complementary.  
Joint representation by a trade union and a consultative committee / works council 
would seem to have some pay-off in terms of satisfaction with information disclosure. Again 
the BWRPS survey suggests that, in a situation where there is a consultative committee / 
works council, workers feel the best informed.  This is followed closely by situations where 
there is both a consultative committee / works council and a trade union. Workers felt less 
well informed where there is just a trade union and least well informed where there were no 
representative arrangements.   
Finally, in this section, we refer briefly to the experience in two continental European 
countries which we have studied.  This suggests that trade unions and information and 
consultation committees tend to complement one another, albeit in complex ways.  Our 
analysis of information disclosure and consultation in Germany (Gospel and Willman, 2002) 
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shows that works councils have benefited from their relationship with trade unions.  Works 
councillors tend to be union members, the union provides advice to the council, and this in 
turn gives the council effectiveness.  In law and practice, through their works councils, 
employees receive more information and experience more consultation than their British 
counterparts.  However, this is not to say that there are no dangers for unions.  In recent 
years, works councils have in some instances superseded unions, with more being discussed 
through the consultation process and with more deviations from union-bargained agreements 
being concluded by works councils.  For unions, this has presented the challenge and 
opportunity of developing new coordinating and servicing roles (Turner, 1991; Thelen, 1991; 
Mitbestimmung Kommission, 1998, Frick and Lehmann, 2001).  
Under the system in France, employers are legally obliged to inform and consult 
employees over a wide range of matters, including via the legally-based comité d’enterprise 
(Gospel and Willman, 2002).  However, it is generally felt by commentators that the French 
system is less effective (Howell, 1992; Gospel and Willman, 2002).  As a result, periodically 
French governments have chosen to intervene to reinforce the system.  In part, the more 
limited success of the French system is because comités d’enterprise have less extensive 
rights and are more employer- led than their German counterparts.  In larger part, however, it 
is because French unions are more fragmented, have less presence at the workplace, and 
consequently have been less able to support the institutions of information and consultation.  
In France, one might conclude that joint consultation and collective bargaining have 
complemented one another less well, the former has often come to substitute for the latter, 
and it may well be that in many instances the comité d’enterprise has supported the union as 
much as vice versa (Howell, 1992:  100-2). 
In conclusion, union organisation and collective bargaining tend to support and 
complement information and consultation.  Of course, it may be the case that, within an 
undertaking, a group of employees may make a request for information and consultation 
arrangements because they are not union members and are not covered by an existing 
collective agreement.  It is also possible that a unionised workforce or a group of union 
members may request information and consultation arrangements because the collective 
bargaining process does not fully cover the subjects or provide for the type of information 
and consultation to which employees are entitled under the legislation.  The former of these 
could be seen as a threat to collective agreements.  The latter could be seen as an opportunity 
to extend the scope of collective bargaining.  There would seem to be no way of gainsaying 
these possibilities under the letter and spirit of the Directive.  It must be up to the trade unions 
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under the collective agreements which exist to prove in the particular circumstances the more 
general point which we are making here, viz that collective bargaining and joint consultation 
can complement one another.  In practice, no doubt, different arrangements will develop 
which will extend from situations where all the information and consultation is carried out 
through trade union channels to situations where all the information and consultation will be 
carried out without trade unions.  In between, there will be some situations where both union 
and non-union arrangements exist for different parts of an undertaking and situations where 
union and non-union arrangements exist in parallel for all workers. 
 
 
A2.  Reponses to General Questions 
 
In Chapter 3 of the discussion paper, two further questions are posed in the context of 
specific organisations.  The first of these is very general but of fundamental importance, viz. 
will the Regulations work, and, if not, what changes would  be needed to make them work?  
The second of these is rather more specific and operational, viz. what sort of guidance would 
be useful and where could advice be obtained?  We deal with the second of these two 
questions first. 
 
A2.1  What sort of guidance would be useful and where could advice be obtained?   
 
We refer briefly to this question since it will be best answered by employers, employees, and 
their representatives who are responsible for operating the Regulations within undertakings. 
Employers will undoubtedly look to their representative bodies to provide guidance on 
how the regulations will operate.  It is known that a number of employers’ associations are 
already providing such guidance in the form of training, auditing, and development of 
blueprints / strategy.  In addition, the Chartered Institute for Personnel and Development 
(CIPD) is providing research and information for its members.  Many other sources of 
guidance are available, from bodies such as the Work Foundation, the Involvement & 
Participation Association, lawyers, and consultants. 
The main gap in guidance and training will undoubtedly be on the side of employees.  
To establish new or to dis-establish existing information and consultation procedures, 
employees will need to know their rights.  To make the operation of such procedures 
effective and beneficial, representatives will also need to be trained and to have resources.  
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Where a trade union is involved, it may help trigger the mechanisms and will be able to 
provide training and resources for representatives.  We have suggested above that this is 
vitally important in countries such as Germany and France where the works council has the 
right to request the presence of experts or the union to assist it in an advisory capacity 
(Gospel and Willman 2003).  There is undoubtedly scope for government support with 
guidance and training packages for employees and unions in this area on the lines of some 
sort of Learning Fund.  There is also a role for the TUC and trade unions to develop 
framework type agreements which can act as possible blueprints. 
Guidance of a more impartial nature will also be available from the Advisory 
Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS).  In this respect, there is a strong case for the 
production of an ACAS Code of Practice.  This would need to revisit the dated code of 
practice under the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act and draw lessons from that (Gospel 
and Lockwood 1999). 
 
A2.2.  Will the Regulations work, and if not what changes would be needed to make 
them work? 
 
Whether the regulations will work and how effective they are likely to be may be adjudged in 
a number of different ways.  They may be adjudged in terms of the information and voice 
they give to employees and the effect they have on the performance of the organisation and 
the consequent well-being of the various stakeholders in the enterprise. 
In terms of the likely effectiveness of information and voice, we have already referred 
to the supporting role which trade unions may play and to the importance of training of 
employee representatives.  Here we would like to draw on our ongoing research on 
information provision, using WERS98 data, to make a number of further points.  We stress 
that the research mainly focuses on the amount of information provided by employers to 
employees and the effects of information provision.   
Our research suggests that more information seems to be provided to employees where 
managements actually have information.  This might seem to be obvious.  But, it is important 
in the following sense and relates to the point made in 1.1 above.  In large and complex 
companies, not all local managements have information on issues such as investment, 
finance, and the general state of the organisation.  They are often not privy to major thinking 
on investment, divestment and closure, and the slimming down of the labour force.  Thus, 
they are not able to meaningfully inform and consult their employees.  This, as we have said, 
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is an argument for information and consultation arrangements existing at all the appropriate 
levels of the company so that the right kind of information can be provided at sufficient time 
for employee representatives to be able effectively to use it. 
Our research also suggests that more information is provided where management 
believes that employees are committed to the values of the organisation.  This is a measure of 
the extent to which managers believe that the goals of employees are aligned to those of the 
organisation.  It might also be seen as a measure of the extent to which managers trust their 
workforce.  Of course, trust runs both ways, and it obviously has to be something to be 
worked at and to be gained via a display of competence and a reduction of uncertainty.  Our 
research also shows that many of the beneficial effects of information provision occur 
because of the effect they have on employee commitment.  The development of commitment 
and trust within an organisation in turn depends on a large number of other management 
practices and relations with the labour force.  It should not therefore be thought that the 
provision of information alone and the entering into consultation will in themselves have a 
beneficial effect; such arrangements will be mediated through the pre-existing institutions, 
practices, and resultant climate of the organisation. 
A further point which emerges from our research is that information is more likely to be 
provided in situations where the financial situation of the establishment is poor.  In other 
words, management is more likely to provide information in bad times rather than good 
times.  Put in slightly different words, information is triggered by a specific event, such as 
poor performance leading to reorganisation or possibly redundancy.  Of course, this finding is 
a rather disappointing and negative.  Our interpretation of the Directive and the hope for the 
Regulations is that they will create standing procedures and institutions which will ensure 
that management provides information in both bad times and good and which allows for the 
development of an agreed agenda as part of a pro-active and on-going process. 
We have referred above to how information provision interacts with the mechanisms 
which exist within the workplace.  To restate the point slightly differently, our research 
suggests that, where there is a works council / consultative committee, more information is 
provided to employees, but not as much as where there is a trade union.  Where a trade union 
and a works council / consultative committee co-exist, slightly more information again is 
provided to employees.  It is noticeable that forms of direct participation do not seem to add 
significantly to the amount of information which is provided to employees (Peccei, Bewley, 
Gospel, and Willman, in preparation).  Thus, information provision will only work where 
there are strong voice institutions to support it. 
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Our research findings also indicate that the performance effect of information sharing is 
likely to vary with different contexts.  However, here we would simply state that the main 
impact of information sharing is on labour productivity and quality.  The effect varies 
depending on existing levels of employee organisational commitment :  sometimes 
information sharing increases employee commitment and sometimes it only has a beneficial 
effect where employee commitment (for whatever reasons) is already high.  Our findings also 
suggest that different forms of disclosure are likely to be more important in some contexts 
than others.  Overall, disclosure of operational information on performance targets and 
outcomes is likely to yield greatest benefits to the firm, especially in non-union settings.  But 
general information disclosure is also likely to be important and have a positive effect, 
particularly in union settings. 
An implication to be drawn from our findings may be that there are horses for courses.  
(1) Information on performance targets and performance outcomes will work best when it is 
provided via consultative committees / works councils or direct forms of involvement.  The 
evidence here is that a trade union may not add much benefit and may indeed have a negative 
effect.  (2) In the case of general information, for this to have a positive impact on 
performance, it is necessary that there be union involvement.  This is arguably because the 
union can best help with the processing and interpretation of such information. If the first 
point is accepted, then there is a challenge for unions to play a positive role in the receipt of 
operational information.  If the second point is accepted, the danger is that non-union 
employees will miss out on such information and the non-union firms will obtain little 
positive effect from its provision. 
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